Category: All Fragilecologies

Fragilecologies Archives
2 July 2003

A long time ago, I began to use the metaphor of birds to identify differing perspectives on the global warming issue. I used hawks, doves, and owls to make my point.

Hawks, at one end of the continuum, encompass those who believe that the signs of global warming are already evident (an apparent increase in record-setting extreme events, the hottest years of record occurring in the past twenty years or so, increasingly intense El Niño events, and so on).

The doves at the other end of the continuum are those who do not believe that human activities can lead to global warming. They might argue that the earth’s system is too robust and is filled with feedback mechanisms that can override any effect of greenhouse gas emissions produced by human activities.

The owls take up the middle of the continuum. They are not as strongly convinced about global warming as are the extreme hawks or doves. They are aware that scientific uncertainties remain in the science of global warming.

Some owls are concerned that societies have the capability to permanently alter the chemical composition of the atmosphere and, therefore, the climate regime. They lean toward the hawks. Other owls are not convinced by existing research about human influences on climate but tend to believe that the human contribution to greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are relatively small, compared to naturally occurring gases; hence, it is not necessarily foreseeable that societies will alter the global climate in irreversible and life-threatening ways.

Alas. A new category has appeared on the horizon: the ostrich. In America, an ostrich is used to symbolize people who bury their head in the sand. Hence, there is no communicating with them when they are in such a mode.

It appears that there are governments, or at least government officials, who do not believe in the possibility that human activities can lead to adverse impacts on the global climate system by warming it up by several degrees Celsius. In fact, they tend to reject any information that challenges their own “cast in stone” views.

A draft of a recent report by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA’s Draft Report on the Environment 2003, www.epa.gov/indicators/) on the state of the environment was reviewed and, in a way, censored by those in the present administration who are opposed to the “doom and gloom” scenarios related to global warming. As a result of this editing, references to the human impacts on the global climate were deleted, as were the references to the adverse impacts on human health of auto emissions and smokestack effluents.

But saying that the prospects of societal involvement in global warming of the atmosphere do not exist does not make it so. Disregarding on purpose the collective assessments of a large majority of scientists is not a refutation of those assessments. It is an “ignore-ance” of them (i.e., burying one’s head in the sand).

All this has been done in full view of the media, the public, and those in other nations who do take global warming seriously, scientific uncertainties notwithstanding.

Hawks, doves, and owls talk to, or at least at each other, seeking to convince those who have not made up their minds about the likelihood of global warming. Ostriches seem not to care about the issue at all. True, funds are provided to reduce uncertainty. However, at the same time funds are being provided to scientists so that politicians can avoid having to make decisions based on existing scientific information and consensus. Ostriches are not a problem – unless they are in power.

Fragilecologies Archives
27 June 2003

In retrospect, the post World War II period was politically speaking an exciting one: post-war reconstruction of Europe, the Marshall Plan, the creation of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the A-bomb and the H-bomb, the Iron curtain, the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, colonial wars for independence, and increasing affluence in many parts of the world. Even under the economic, political and ideological pressures of the Cold War, it was in many ways an era of rising expectations in poor as well as in rich countries.

In the late 1950s, a period of coups, emerging guerilla wars and wars for independence, James C. Davies came up with a theory about rising expectations and the likelihood of armed conflict. His idea became known as the Davies J-curve. Here is how it works: for a given individual, life is getting better in real terms: increasing salary and benefits, improved nutritional status, the ability to purchase better modes of transportation, among other items well beyond his or her basic need. However, the individual wants more than s/he can afford. S/he thins that his or her standards of living should be getting better at a faster rate than it is. In other words, the pace of reality is not keeping up with his or her expectations about how much better it should be. Nevertheless, while it may be frustrating to the individual not to have his or her reality keep up with his or her rising expectations, the individual’s situation is not so bad that it leads either to conflict or to frustration. That’s the situation in an era of rising expectations, as it was, say, in the 1960s.

Davies J-Curve

Problems arise, however, if there happens to be a sudden downturn in that individual’s well-being, while his or her expectations are still on the rise. This results in a relatively rapid, sharp decline in one’s actual well-being. Thus, a major gap is created between one’s expectations and one’s reality. Frustration ensues, thereby generating discontent. This was Davies’ explanation for social unrest and the increased potential for political unrest in a given country. The J-curve was devised as one explanation for why unrest and conflict occurs. I would contend that today we are witnessing the application of the J-curve to domestic politics. Here’s how:

The U.S. engaged in a “War on Terrorism.” We now have a cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security. We have a color-coded terrorism early warning system of sorts in place. We have toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and  many al-Qaeda personnel have been captured or put out of commission around the globe. The expectations of the American public have been raised about the success of the U.S. and its allies in containing terrorism abroad as well as at home. For a while, our expectations about winning a war on terrorism were rising, but not as fast as we would have liked.

Suddenly, we are told about the fact that the government has been receiving warnings at an increasing rate about an increase in al-Qaeda “chatter” about possible attacks on shopping malls, tall buildings, apartment houses, hospitals, water supplies and even the possibility of blowing up the Brooklyn Bridge.

Following this increase in news items about the belief that al-Qaeda (as well as the Taliban in Afghanistan) have been regrouping, top government officials (senators, the Vice President, the FBI Director and now the Secretary of Defense) talk about their belief that terrorist attacks will definitely happen in the not too distant future somewhere on American soil. We are told about how porous our international borders really are. They tell the public through the electronic and printed media (newspapers, TV, and radio), that terrorist attacks will be devastating, maybe even cataclysmic.

The way I see this change in outputs from the government about how successful we are in the war on terrorism and on the homeland security front is as follows: government officials are making statements that in essence are designed to lower the expectations of the public about the government’s ability to prevent all terrorist acts on our soil. The problem with this situation is the following: if we expect less from our government, we will get less. The point is that, while it is difficult for a government, any government, to keep up with the rising expectations of its citizens (demands, wishes, needs), it can easily match declining expectations. Not only that. It can cause the expectations of its citizens to decline – about the state of the economy, of environmental protections, about war – and about a war on terrorism.

Davies J-Curve modified by Glantz

The government, in a way, is admitting that its war on terrorism is much more difficult and protracted than it had at first realized. As a result of this realization, it has been preparing the public for events that it is admitting it cannot prevent. Hence, our expectations – that is, to expect less from the government – will match reality. In fact, we show little reaction to failures because we are being asked tacitly to expect less from our government. As our expectations of success decline, our government can easily match those expectations. Hence, this will reduce public frustration over the lack of government success in eradicating terrorist acts against America. Instead of being frustrated and thereby prompted to oppose the government, the citizenry in general shrugs its collective shoulders, sighs and goes on with its daily routine, expecting even less from its government.

Davies, James C. 1962.
“Towards a Theory of Revolution”, American Sociological Review,
Vol. XXVII. p. 5-18.

Fragilecologies Archives
15 April 2003

As I watch Iraqi people, ordinary people, vent their anger at everything that carries the portrait of Saddam Hussein, I wonder what Saddam would be thinking, or might have thought, if he were watching. Decades of the symbols planted everywhere by his regime reconfirming the omnipotence of his rule are being uprooted, toppled, burned, torn up, and defaced. Symbols of control have been turned into symbols of anti-government rage. But does he care?

Aside from the fact that he has been deposed, lost power, suffered humiliation if not from military defeat then from having his own people repeatedly smash his image with a shoe – an apparent Iraqi form of insult – and aside from watching the firebombing and looting of his numerous palaces, what might he feel? Maybe nothing.

He had a good life, from his perspective. He may feel that history will judge him favorably in the long run. Remember that Hitler was one of the images that he held in high regard (or so we were led to believe). Now his image is on the front cover of Time Magazine with a big red X across his face, as has been done only once before, with Hitler in 1945.

Stories have and will continue to emerge about the fear he instilled in his people, about his constant and widespread use of torture, threats, and murders as ways to keep millions of his citizens in line. The regime’s rulers apparently lived very well at the expense of the rest of the Iraqi people. As jobs go, being the dictator for some decades was a good one. Now he is out of office and may be dead, but while he lived, he personally lived well. The truth is that he was respected, as well as protected, by other leaders in the region. now the Saddam era is over. What message does that send to other leaders who are seen as despots or even as benevolent totalitarian leaders?

The Cuban leader, Fidel Castro, and the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, among others, are probably concerned that they might be the next targets of a US government, pumped up and jingoistic as the result of a rather impressive rapid sweep through Iraq and the collapse of the Iraqi dictatorship. Castro’s regime has tightened its already tight control over dissidents in Cuba, coming up with harsh sentences for those considered to be enemies of the regime. Kim has been rattling his nuclear sword to warn the United States not to think about trying to topple his regime. He appears to be copying a Mao statement about China from decades ago: North Korea may be a paper tiger in the eyes of the US military, but it is a paper tiger with nuclear teeth. These fears are obvious to those dictators who watched the fall of the regime of one of their ilk.

I wonder if they are also watching the toppling of their statues, the looting of their properties, the defacing of their symbols of power and control. Do they see this as a process likely to take place if they are removed from power voluntarily, by force, or as a result of their natural death? Will their roles in the history of their countries be tarnished and then erased by future, if not present, generations? Tito of Yugoslavia apparently paid little attention to political succession, and his country fell into pieces when he died. To what extent did he realize, or even care, what might happen after his death? And Franco in Spain, did he care that his form of government would be rejected after his death? I wonder if dictators in general care very much about what happens to their countries once they are gone.

Today’s dictators are witnessing the revenge of a frustrated and poor population after decades of deprivation, threats, and neglect. Will their legacies suffer the same fate? I think so. Do they really care? I think not.

Fragilecologies Archives
15 April 2003

More than forty years ago, geographer Glenn Trewartha published his book, The Earth’s Problem Climates. Trewartha’s selection of what he considered at that time to be the earth’s “problem climates” was based on information available before 1960. He described a problem climate as one that does not really conform to what might be expected for a given latitude:

Were the earth’s surface homogeneous (either land or water) and lacking terrain irregularities, it may be presumed that atmospheric pressure, winds, temperature, and precipitation would be arranged in zonal or east-west belts (p. 3).

He focused on “regional climatic aberrations,” explicitly noting that he was writing for physical scientists, and not the general public. In his words,

It is designed to meet the needs of those interested in the professional aspects of climate rather than laymen. A methodical description of all the earth’s climates is not attempted, for many areas are climatically so normal or usual that they require little comment in a book which professes to emphasize the exceptional (p. 6, emphasis added).

Is such a statement still valid, given what we have learned about climate since 1960? Are there really areas on the globe that could be viewed as “climatically so normal or usual that they require little comment”? Are there exceptional “problem climates”? Should we also be asking questions about societies’ role, if any, in the existence of problem climates?

There are two ways to look at the term problem climates: from a physical perspective and from an anthropocentric perspective. Climate processes are natural processes that center on the physical characteristics and behavior of the atmosphere. The second way is anthropocentric, because climate’s processes interact with human activities and with the resources on which those activities depend.

Problem climates, then, are generated not only by changes in rainfall, temperature, pressure, or wind, but also by changes in human activities, such as deforestation, urbanization, desertification, and fossil fuel burning. For their part, societies can no longer be portrayed as just victims of the climate system (its means, modes, and extremes) but are involved in the various ways that the climate system and its impacts might be changing.

The phrase “problem societies” refers to climate and climate-related factors that affect the ability of society or the environment to interact effectively with the climate system. Accepting the fact that there are many things about the behavior of the atmosphere that we do not yet understand, it is also important to note that there is a considerable amount of usable information we already know about the interactions between human activities and the climate system. Nevertheless, societies knowingly still engage in activities that increase their vulnerability or reduce their resilience in the face of a varying climate system.

In the early 1970s, the Club of Rome created the concept of “World Problematique.” It is summarized as follows:

The complexity of the world problematique lies in the high level of mutual interdependence of all these problems on the one hand, and in the long time it often takes until the impact of the action and reaction in this complex system becomes visible.

The notion of problematique (problematic) should be applied to climate and climate-related issues. While every regional or local climate can be viewed to varying degrees as a problem climate in the natural science sense, the word “problematic” better captures the contemporary realization of what constitutes a problem climate. It suggests a more holistic view of the climate system in which
human activities have become another factor that forces changes in climate.

Our problem is not only that we have to cope with a variable and changing global climate, but is also with the pathways that societies have chosen to pursue in order to develop their economies, often with little regard to the impacts on climate. This brings to mind the Pogo cartoon: “I have met the enemy and he is us!” It is time to start pointing the finger at problem societies as well as at problem climates.

Trewartha, G.T., 1961: The Earth’s Problem Climates. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.

www.clubofrome.org/about/world_problematique.php

Fragilecologies Archives
18 February 2003

The US government wants to take out Saddam Hussein. It has wanted to do so for a long time. Talk of the possibility of a unilateral military action by the US heightened by mid-2002. Allies and potential allies of the US alike sought more evidence about the immediacy of the threat that Saddam posed to the region and the rest of the world. The Bush administration delayed immediate military action for a variety of reasons, not the least of which being that its military was not positioned for a war on the other side of the globe, its NATO allies were not thoroughly convinced of the threat and not all of Bush’s advisors agreed that the threat to the US was near and real. Although it delayed taking action, it did not hold back on the war-like rhetoric of several of its high-ranking members. The hawks in the government seemed to believe that a coalition, such as the one put together for the first Bush war in 1991, could be re-formed. But, alas, a coalition was not forthcoming. As time passed, diplomatic opposition to a second Bush-led war grew: France, Germany and Belgium, NATO members, refused to march to the beat of the war drum coming out of Washington, DC. They were joined by the Russians, the Chinese and the Mexicans, further isolating the US, the UK and 16 other NATO members who favored military action, sooner rather than later.

Opposition to what increasingly seemed to be a US-inspired war (for reasons related to oil or revenge) spread from the halls of NATO and the UN Security Council to the streets, with millions of people chanting anti-war and anti-Bush slogans in the streets of Rome, London, Paris, Berlin, Amsterdam, Madrid, Amman, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires and in the US – Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York City, among others. Such demonstrations must have generated problems within Bush’s inner circle.

At the same time that people were marching in the streets, that diplomats were debating in the UN, and that the Bush people were thinking about how to proceed, well over 150,000 troops and all kinds of military equipment have been mobilized to the Middle East and more call-ups are planned. [I wonder if the government has already made medals for the future combatants in the upcoming Iraqi campaign].

Photo by John Hopewell. Anti-war Protest in Amsterdam, Netherlands on Saturday, February 15, 2003.

So, what is the present-day situation? A mini-coalition has been formed and troops are lined up to participate in a war to topple Saddam. Popular and diplomatic opposition is rising rapidly and becoming increasingly public and vocal. This puts the Bush administration in an awkward place, as the title suggests: between Iraq and a hard place. Enter into an unpopular military action (even for the right reasons) or have the coalition troops stand down as they say in the military: that is the choice facing the President. But, can Bush back away from his stated policy, put a stop to the hawkish rhetoric of
his Secretary of Defense {America can fight a two-front war; America will not rule out the first use of nukes, etc.) as well as others who advise him on matters of war and peace, bring the troops back home without a fight? How can the US back off without losing face domestically as well as internationally and without giving bragging rights to Saddam and to the anti-war folks?

It seems that the only way out for Bush without losing face would be to remobilize coalition troops elsewhere to cover a more ominous threat. Enter North Korea. Is that the role that North Korea might play, as far as Bush is concerned? Time will tell… but not very much time remains. Something has to happen soon.

Having constructed such a dismal scenario, I still think that there may be a peaceful way to end these potential confrontations. It will require that the anti-war people, those inside the Bush administration along with those outside it, develop a way to get the hawks who have painted themselves into a corner, a way to gracefully get out of that proverbial corner. Not an easy task but a necessary one.

Fragilecologies Archives
29 January 2003
Guest Editorial: By Dr. Mary Voice
Climatologist, Cumulus Consulting, Australia

In Australia, the first drought where the influence of human-induced global warming may be discernable has just occurred. Hotter droughts mean more risks. Risks to fragile ecologies and human environments.

During 2002 and early 2003, Australia experienced arguably its worst drought since reliable records began in 1910. Over huge areas of the continent, rainfall was similar to three or four of the previous most severe droughts. So why are the climatologists at Monash University and the Bureau of Meteorology describing it as the worst? The reason is that temperatures in 2002 were significantly higher than in other drought years, at least since 1950. Prolonged higher temperatures caused a marked increase in evaporation rates, drying of soils and stress on crops, animals and vegetation. The gross value of farm production is forecast to fall by around 20 per cent for 2002-03.

The drought was linked to El Niño – most Australian droughts are – a phenomenon that is part of natural climate variability. We expect, on average, warmer day-time temperatures and slightly cooler night-time temperatures during droughts because of the clear skies. But the 2002 maximum temperatures are the warmest of any year since 1950 and unusually warm when compared to the five major droughts since 1950 – facts consistent with an influence of global warming.

The higher maximum temperatures and drier conditions also created greater bushfire danger than in previous droughts. During January 2003, huge areas of Australia’s alpine national parks were burned and Australia’s national capital, Canberra, lost over 500 houses to firestorms erupting from adjacent forests.

Australia’s ecology is simultaneously robust and fragile. Robust to drought and fires, it has been shaped by these forces over thousands of years. But its fragility can also be seen in species at risk of extinction and in examples of ecological niches being transformed over very short spaces of time. In the 19th century, open treed grasslands in parts of eastern Australia were transformed into thick woody scrubby country within a decade when a combination of forces occurred – extinction of small marsupials, severe drought causing de-stocking followed by widespread flooding. Millions of seedlings, previously kept in check by marsupials and periodic grass burning by aborigines, became established. During the 2002-03 high risk fire season, wildlife experts fear that rare wildlife species will be burned to extinction, and some of them claim that our sub-optimal management of fire-prone forests is partly to blame.

And in recent times (ecologically) new forces are at play. There has never been a population of 20 million humans in Australia before. Nor has the landscape ever been used in the past to feed 20 million Australians and maybe 3 times that number of people elsewhere. Communities and families build and live close to significant fire risk areas. A debate has been flaring and subsiding for many decades on how best to manage forested and other fire-prone areas. Public policy on fire management is influenced by a less than complete understanding of the robustness and fragility of the ecologies, by fears of litigation from both action and inaction, and by the influence of divergent lobby groups. And now our droughts seem to be hotter and therefore riskier.

When the “worst” drought happens and a bad bushfire season flares, debates also flare. The debate has already flared over leaving native forests in their “natural” state or managing them with a program of fuel (mostly ground litter) reduction. The debate has already begun over whether it is the enhanced Greenhouse effect or just natural climate variability that has made the 2002-03 drought so hot. If, however, droughts are hotter and riskier, past wisdoms may need some rethinking, past practices may need some adjustment:

• Fire management strategies of the past may no longer mesh with the changing nature of Australian droughts and the increasing fragility of some ecologies, and may need fine-tuning.
• Housing standards in fire-prone areas may need to be given the same authority as standards for tropical cyclone areas.
• Previous views that the cost was too high for the small gain expected from Australia signing the Kyoto protocol, may need to be adjusted in the light (heat) of increasing costs of not signing (bearing in mind that much of the benefits are likely to be long-term).

Each group involved with these burning hot issues is under a different set of pressures – individuals rebuilding to house the family, local communities wishing to maintain some control in shaping their community and environment, ecologists and climatologists required to give expert opinion based on best available assessments, elected representatives asked to find quick fixes, legislators and regulators balancing individual freedom vs community rights. The challenge is to mould those divergent views, competing pressures and growing bodies of knowledge into solutions that are appropriate to the scale and scope of the problem.

This is precisely the same challenge for any environmental issue anywhere in the world – matching the scale and scope of the problem to appropriately scaled, appropriately flexible and effective responses.

Fragilecologies Archives
2003
By Dr. Michael H. Glantz and John Firor

Fragilecologies Archives
ESIG Alert #1, October 2002
View in PDF
Link to Full Workshop Report

On 18-19 June 2002, Michael Glantz, senior scientist in the Environmental and Societal Impacts Group (ESIG), in cooperation with NOAA’s Office of Global Programs, convened an Informal Planning Meeting to discuss climate and trans-border water and equity issues in Central Asia in general and, more specifically, in the Amudarya (river) basin.

Discussion centered on climate, water, political, and development issues. Although the meeting was based on the Amudarya basin, discussions included the roles of other countries in the region – China, Pakistan, Iran, and especially Afghanistan – in addition to the five Central Asian Republics.

The receding shoreline of the Aral Sea. The former fishing port of Muynak is now more than 150 km from the Aral Sea’s shoreline. (photo by M.H. Glantz) Before 1960, the Aral Sea was the fourth-largest inland body of water on Earth. Today, it is on the edge of extinction. The Sea is fed by Central Asia’s two major rivers, the Amudarya and the Syrdarya, with a flow, respectively, of about 70 and 35 cu km per year on average. The Amudarya is formed by the Pyanj River (Afghanistan) and the Vaksh River (Tajikistan). The Syrdarya is formed in the Tien Shan mountains and flows through Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, making its way toward the Aral Sea. By the 1970s, the Syrdarya failed to reach the Sea, and in the late 1980s the mighty Amudarya also failed to reach the Sea. In the early 1990s some river water reached the Sea, but by then the Sea had split into two parts, the Small Aral (fed by the Syrdarya) and the Big Aral (fed by the Amudarya). In 1954, construction began on the Karakum Canal in order to bring Amudarya water to oases in the desert of the Karakum.

The Central Asian region, with a dark blue line showing the Amudarya’s watercourse from its headwaters to the Aral Sea.

Today, the Aral story is quite well known to environmental groups within and outside the region, and it was brought to worldwide attention as the result of a February 1990 National Geographic Magazine article. The rivers’ waters still flow out of the Pamir Mountains and the Hindu Kush toward the Aral Seas (Big and Small). Its watercourse serves as an international border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan and between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan.
The Amudarya crisscrosses Turkmenistan and, for the most part, traverses the length of Uzbekistan and its subregion known as Karakalpakstan. Although an upstream riparian country, Afghanistan, 17% of which lies within the Amudarya basin, has been at war for a couple of decades and in-country conflict remains. As a result, it has had little opportunity to lay claim to its legitimate share of Amudarya water. With an end to the Russo-Afghan war and the Taliban regime, and with international involvement to bring a semblance of peace and stability to the country in the conflict-laden post-Taliban period, the new Afghan government will surely lay claim to a significant share of Amudarya water as it reconstructs the nation’s agricultural sector.

A key premise for the meeting was to discuss the consequences of the likelihood of demands by Afghanistan for its fair share of Amudarya water, now that the Taliban regime has been replaced. Even though the supply of water from the Amudarya could be sufficient for all the inhabitants of the basin, under the current situation water is scarce, especially in the downstream regions in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which cannot afford to lose any more water to diversions than has already occurred since their independence in 1991.

Equity concerns were voiced about the continually deteriorating plight of the Karakalpak people who inhabit the lower reaches near the Aral Sea. They are the end users of very polluted water, land, and air in the disaster zone near the Sea. The multi-year regional meteorological drought, food shortages, and news about the declining extent of glaciers in the Pamirs (an indicator of long-term climate change in the region) has led to an attitude change in Central Asian governments concerning climate issues. They are increasingly aware of their growing vulnerability to climate variability, extremes, and change. As a result, there appears to be a resurgent interest in Uzbekistan (and from some Russian political figures) for water transfer from Siberian rivers to arid Central Asia.

Several activities proposed relate directly to water resources, climate considerations, capacity building, equity issues, and regional cooperation and development:

• A central point of concern is the widely acknowledged inefficiency in the use of water in Central Asia’s three major rivers (the Amudarya, the Syrdarya, and the Karakum Canal, among the longest manmade canals in the world). Improved efficiency in agriculture, a reallocation of water among sectors using water more efficiently, such as industries and services, as well as a shift from food self-sufficiency to food security should precede attempts to bring water supplies from other sources outside the basin.
• Central Asia is caught between the blades of a proverbial pair of scissors: growing populations, and a possible dwindling supply of water in the region. Climate projections (scenarios) must be made in tandem with demographic projections (scenarios) over the next few decades.
• There is an urgent and strong need for capacity building in the areas of water resource management, and climate studies and forecasting for Afghanistan specifically, and for the other states in the Amudarya basin in general. This will involve considerable coordinated support from donor nations.
• There is a need to identify all of the climate- and water-related national and regional early warning systems in the Central Asian Republics and Afghanistan. This includes a restoration on a regional basis of the climate and climate-related monitoring networks. It is important, if not crucial, to consider how best to combine them and make them more effective.
• There is a need for transparency with respect to streamflow withdrawals, usage, and efficiency of use ratings by Amudarya basin states, as well as Aral basin states, and overall climate monitoring (glacial melt, climate change, etc).
• The inhabitants of Karakalpakstan are in dire need of international assistance with regard to health, access to clean water, employment (re-education and training).
• Donor organizations need to consider how best to coordinate their activities in “Greater Central Asia.” Donor countries need to deliver on their pledges for assistance in a timely fashion.

This Informal Planning Meeting was hosted by The Franklin Institute (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), and was supported by NOAA’s Office of Global Programs and by ESIG at the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) in Boulder, Colorado. A full report for the meeting was prepared by ESIG with input from all of the 23 participants. It is available on line and in hard copy upon request. See the website at ccb colorado.edu/centralasia

The IPM participants on the roof of The Franklin Institute, Philadelphia, during a break from deliberations. They represented 9 different countries as well as the United States.

Fragilecologies Archives
ESIG Alert #2, November 2002
View in PDF

The image portrays the popular view of the old Silk Road that passes through western China into Central Asia. And such an image exists today in parts of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. However, the region is in the midst of rapid development, as is much of China.

During 2002, Xinjiang University in Urumqi, China, and NCAR’s Environmental and Societal Impacts Group (ESIG), and Colorado State University researchers worked together to propose a plan for the development of an International Center for Desert Affairs (ICDA). This plan was given official approval by the government of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, and on 18 October 2002 an inauguration ceremony was held on Xinjiang University’s campus. ESIG and CSU representatives were present.

Professor Xiaoling Pan, Dean of the College of Resources and Environmental Sciences at Xinjiang University, and Dr. Michael Glantz, NCAR Senior Scientist, will act as Co-Directors during the Center’s startup phase. Dr. Qian Ye, Scientific Visitor to ESIG, will act as the Center’s Executive Director. The development of ICDA was fostered in large measure by Dr. Wei Gao at Colorado State University.

The Center’s program is focused on what we refer to as the 4 “Ds”: Drought, Desertification, Development and Diversity. Drought issues involve but are not limited to the harmonious development of natural resources in arid and semiarid areas in the context of global change; Desertification issues will focus on patterns and approaches to oasis stability and research on the rehabilitation of degraded ecosystems; cultural Diversity involves sociological and anthropological research on cultural cooperation and conflict in arid and semiarid areas; and Development issues will center on the development and pursuit of sustainable strategies relating to water, land, and energy exploration and use.

The initial activities of ICDA are as follows: to establish a series of graduate and undergraduate educational courses on a range of desert issues such as desert science, human impacts on desert environments, the policies, laws and politics of the development of arid and semiarid lands, the costs and benefits of the development of fragile desert environments, and the ethical and equity issues related to the development of arid areas. Scientists from countries in the Greater Central Asian region will be brought together for an exchange of ideas and research on sustainable development prospects for the region. The Center will convene multidisciplinary workshops and planning activities to share information and technologies for regional development. Education and training on desert affairs will be a high priority.

China has been aggressively pursuing development strategies in the last two decades. As part of this national strategy, in 1999 the Chinese government announced a Western Region Development Strategy (WRDS) to develop the western part of the country within the next decade and to establish a “new western China” by the middle of the 21st century. A major component of the WRDS is the sustainable development of its arid and semiarid regions. The goal is to enable all people in the region to enjoy economic prosperity, social stability, ethnic unity, and an ecologically healthy and sustainable landscape. To achieve this, China has already begun to speed up the building of infrastructure in the western region.

Many observers are concerned about the potential impacts on the environment and minority cultures in the region. It is not yet clear to what extent the government will pursue economic development opportunities and maintain environmental protection, preservation of natural resources, and cultural diversity.

Xinjiang University in Urumqi is situated between the Taklimakan Desert to the south, and the Gobi Desert to the east. Much of the desert is uninhabited, with a large ecotone (i.e., transition zone between adjacent ecological systems) between the Tian Shan Mountains, a major source of water in the region, and these deserts. Within the ecotone lie oases, which are rich in natural resources but are very fragile ecosystems. The entire region is vulnerable to climate change and climate variability. Rainfall is highly variable from year to year and from place to place, as is the case in arid and semiarid areas. The annual rainfall in the northern part of Xinjiang Province is around 150 mm and around 50 mm in the southern part. Much of the region has suffered in the past decades from drought.

Ancient Irrigation System

The karez irrigation system (kar means well and ez means underground in Uygur) is an ancient series of wells and underground channels that transfer water from the glaciers of the Tian Shan Mountains to oasis communities in the area. Putting the majority of the channel underground reduces water loss from seepage and evaporation. Construction started around 2,000 years ago; most activities were begun during the Han and Qing Dynasty. Many cities on the ancient Silk Road, some as far west as modern Iran, still rely on this irrigation system as a primary supply of water. In the oasis city of Turpan, there are more than 1,000 of these irrigation systems. Urban centers are growing in spatial extent and in population (e.g., Urumqi has a population of about 2.2 million people).

First Steps for the New Center for Desert Affairs

The overriding goal of the International Center for Desert Affairs is to develop regionally focused research, education, and training programs to address problems of common concern in the Xinjiang region and in Greater Central Asia (see ESIG Alert # 1 for the Greater Central Asia report). There is a need to:

• Establish an international network of natural and social scientists, decision-makers, and educators.
• Implement an interactive website to facilitate exchange among these groups.
• Convene a national and a regional (Greater Central Asia) conference of researchers on arid and semiarid lands to discuss plans to prevent, mitigate or adapt to arid and semiarid land hotspots.
• Identify other areas that have successfully transformed such areas into productive land-use activities, such as those in California and Israel.
• Develop a set of courses that gives undergraduate as well as other students a multidisciplinary background in Desert Affairs in order to further the next generation of researchers.

Although the key phrase is “Desert Affairs,” it is well understood that the range of issues will encompass not only the hyper-arid desert regions, but the surrounding mountains as well. They are the sources of water to oases and provide the resources needed for settlements to develop in an otherwise harsh environment. There is considerable interaction on a seasonal basis for below-sea-level basins to the highest elevations of, for example, the Tian Shan Mountains in Xinjiang. The same is true for other arid and semiarid areas in Greater Central Asia and elsewhere.

For more information about ICDA, Desert Affairs, or the interdisciplinary project at Xinjiang University, please contact Michael Glantz or Qian Ye at the US National Center for Atmospheric Research; email glantz@ucar.edu or ye@ucar.edu. A website will be available in the near future at www.esig.ucar.edu/desert/

The inauguration of the Desert Affairs Center at Xinjiang University, Urumqi, China, 18 October 2002. Participants included the President of the University and the Governor of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Province.

Fragilecologies Archives
18 December 2002
Guest Editorial: Dr. Lino Naranjo Diaz
Santiago de Compostela, Spain

“The Prestige is our Chernobyl” –> (Spanish Government Official)”

On November 13, 2002, a severe storm hit the Galician coast in Spain along the northwestern tip of the Iberian Peninsula. Heavy rains and high winds of over 120 km/h were observed over the region, and especially over the maritime area near the Atlantic coast of Galicia. This was not unusual for that time of the year. Autumn and winter in this part of the world are usually characterized by a high frequency of winter storms that have heavy rainfall and high gusty winds, and navigation in this region becomes especially risky. In ancient times, Romans called the northwestern tip of this land “Cape Finisterrae” (End of the World), and in modern times this coastal area is known as “Costa da Morte” (The Dead Coast). Severe storms have destroyed many ships over the centuries. However, November 13, 2002, was special: a single-hulled tank steamer named Prestige, bound for Singapore with more than 77,000 metric tons of fuel oil on board, suffered from the high winds and turbulent sea very near the Spanish coast and began to spill fuel. This was the start of one of the worst ecological disasters ever recorded in Galicia, in Spain, in Europe, and even worldwide. The Prestige was transporting twice as much oil as the infamous Exxon Valdez, which went aground in Alaskan waters in 1989.

Various factors contributed to the increasing magnitude of the disaster, but the most important one was undoubtedly the “weather connection.” On November 14, the Spanish government made the decision to move the vessel westward, away from the coast. They believed such a movement would prevent the fuel from spreading to any part of the Iberian coast. However, when the ship began to move away from Costa de Morte, it was surprisingly carried southward toward Portuguese waters, spreading the oil spill into a long “fuel front” exactly to the west, exposing almost the entire Atlantic coastline of Galicia. This was a terrible mistake, because it did not take into account the climate factor. The winds in autumn normally blow from the west, and forecasts from many sources indicated that changes for westerly (eastward-flowing) winds over the area for the next few days was practically assured. As a consequence, “black tides” of highly toxic fuel oil began to reach the coastal areas, driven by high westerly winds during the next two weeks. The oil slick virtually destroyed one of the most beautiful and richest areas for fishing in Europe, affecting the economy and the basis of many fishermen’s livelihood. Hundreds of beaches were destroyed, and the wildlife has been severely damaged, which affects the crucial economic activities such as tourism.

Are individuals, institutions, or governments to blame for this environmental tragedy? Searching for reasonable explanations about why weather and climate factors were not adequately taken into account is currently almost impossible. However, some lessons have to be learned. On a national level, Spain did not have a preparedness plan for this kind of disaster. Although these kinds of events are not unusual in Galicia, the magnitude of this event forced the national government to take urgent action. It had to improvise under strong regional pressure and, consequently, obstructed the development of faster relief measures. This increased the chances for making severe mistakes.

For the first time, a “human-made” disaster has had a harsh impact on all stages of Galician social life, and even in all of Spain. The political consequences in the long term are very difficult to predict. The capacity of the European Union (EU) to exert a leadership role in environmental protection, following the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol process, has also been called into question. The EU has maintained a very weak policy about ocean transport of dangerous cargo, a policy forced by the economic interests of some EU members.

Currently, the Prestige is an ecological time bomb. Sunk 3,000 meters deep in the Atlantic Ocean, with 40,000 tons of fuel oil remaining in its tanks, it continues to represent a serious threat not only to Galicia, but to other locations in the Atlantic as well. Living marine resources in this part of the Atlantic could be damaged by the toxic waste; fishing industries of several countries could be impacted in a wider sense. The Prestige disaster might, for example, prove to be the beginning of the end for many parts of the rich fishing industry based in Galicia. It is also the beginning of the end of the old EU policy regarding the security of transportation in European seas and coastal areas. In any event, what the Prestige disaster MUST be is the beginning of the end of a worldwide policy that relegates the environment to being held hostage to the economic interests in the name of human well-being. Back home, thousands of Galician fishermen remain at risk, and the world must pay attention.